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In cases concerning joint and several liability,' in which an en-
tire judgment has been awarded against fewer than all tortfeasors, an
equitable distribution of the loss depends upon the substantive right
of contribution.' Following the common law, federal antitrust law
has been reluctant to develop a right to contribution in private treble
damage actions.' In almost ninety years of private antitrust litiga-
tion4 only one federal court5 has been persuaded, by the potentially
catastrophic results that may arise from a combination of treble
damages and joint and several liability, to allow contribution. With
the increase in massive judgments6 and the availability of class ac-
1. Courts often confuse joint substantive liability and procedural joinder of parties. See
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 291-99 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W.
PROSSER]; Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413 (1937). Unless other-
wise stated, this comment only considers the former, and designates those jointly and severally
liable as 'joint tortfeasors" or "cotortfeasors."
2. "The procedural methods of enforcing the right of contribution.., are determined
by the law of the forum. But the right of contribution itself is substantive and where. . . there
is no right to contribution between tortfeasors, a party sued for a tort may not file a third-party
complaint." Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722, 734 (W.D. Ark. 1959), aft'd, 273 F.2d 388 (8th
Cir. 1960). A defendant in an antitrust case cannot compel joinder of its joint tortfeasors
under a theory that they are "indispensable parties" to the action whose absence requires dis-
missal under FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b). Since complete relief can be obtained from the named
defendant, "[it is hornbook law that one tortfeasor... may not claim that another, a joint
tortfeasor, is an indispensable party." Martin v. Chandler, 85 F. Supp. 131, 132 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) (antitrust case). See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 296-97. Cf Herpich v. Wallace, 430
F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970) (securities case); Dunlop v. Beloit College, 411 F. Supp. 398 (W.D.
Wis. 1976) (civil rights case). But see Crivello v. Four Bros., Inc., 58 F.R.D. 216 (E.D. Wis.
1972) (antitrust case); Edwards v. Rogers, 120 F. Supp. 499 (E.D.S.C. 1954) (joint tortfeasors in
an automobile accident are necessary parties).
3. See note 25 infra. The term "treble damage action," as used in this comment, refers
to private actions brought under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1973), which
provides that "[any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id
4. The present Section 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1973), was enacted as part of the 1914 Clayton
Act amendment to the Sherman Act. It replaced a similar section of the Sherman Act, Act of
July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (repealed by Act of July 5, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat.
570, which authorized treble damage suits, but had limited them to violations of the Sherman
Act). Treble damage suits are currently authorized under all "antitrust laws" as that term is
defined in Section I of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1973). See Nashville Milk Co. v.
Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
5. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th
Cir. 1979). See notes 15-24 and accompanying text infra.
6. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 919 ANTITRUST & TRADE
tion suits under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,7 the
problem has become increasingly acute.' Clearly, in order to main-
tain the integrity of the private antitrust action, an equitable appor-
tionment of damages among cotortfeasors9 must be allowed.'"
Traditionally, the common law has denied contribution among
tortfeasors." I The rationale was "that as a matter of policy the courts
ought not 'to make relative value judgments of degress of culpability
REG. REP. (BNA) A-2 (5th Cir. June 21, 1979) (partial settlement of $308 million); Telex Corp.
v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (judgment of $260.7 million); West Virginia v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) ($10 million settlement);
TWA, Inc. v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified on other grounds, 449 F.2d
51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973) ($137 million judgment, includ-
ing attorneys' fees of $7.5 million). See Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties.-
Ana ysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1043 (1952).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 23 (1976). During 1978, 183 private antitrust class action suits were filed
in the federal district courts, which was down from 235 in 1977, AD. OFF. U.S. COURTS ANN.
REP. A-154 (1978). Although antitrust claims constituted only 1.1% of the civil cases com-
menced in 1978, antitrust class action suits represented 12.4% of the total 1978 class actions
filed. For a discussion on the importance of antitrust class action suits see Larabee, Substantive
Policies and Procedural Decisions- An Approach to Certifying Rule 23(b) Antitrust Class Actions,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 491 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Larabeel. See also 2 P. AREEDA & D. TUR-
NER, ANTITRUST LAW, 153-59 (1978) [hereinafter cited as P. AREEDA & D. TURNER].
8. "Plaintiffs... have recovered more in the last 2 years (nearly $2 billion) than in the
previous 50 years." SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT ON ANTITRUST EQUAL ENFORCE-
MENT ACT OF 1979) (S. 1468), S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1979).
9. Courts have uniformily characterized a private antitrust suit as a tort action. See,
e.g., Solomon v. Houston Corr. Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 392 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976); Williamson v.
Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 110 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied 310 U.S. 639 (1940);
United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 571 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Antitrust violations are
analogous to the common-law competitive torts. See Comment, Developments in the Law-
Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 926-32 (1964).
10. Absent the right of contribution, the following situation can easily arise: Company
A, a small local distributor participates in an antitrust violation organized by Company B, a
national manufacturer. Company A and Company B are jointly and severally liable along
with all other distributors in the scheme for treble the damages caused. See, e.g., Solomon v.
Houston Corr. Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 392 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58
F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
Another serious problem, absent the right of contribution in antitrust cases, is that a treble
damage plaintiff may obtain and enforce a judgment against any or all of the tortfeasors,
regardless of whether the plaintiff has dealt directly with the party sued. See Olson Farms,
Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1 (10th Cir., Nov.
15, 1979); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Cal. 1968).
The plaintiff thus decides who will pay the judgment. Parties that the plaintiff decides not to
sue go "scot free" regardless of their culpability. See notes 22-26 and accompanying text infra.
11. The first report of a case in which a defendant sought contribution from an inten-
tional tortfeasor is Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). Although it spoke
of a rule against contribution in "tort" cases, "the word 'tort' had not come to be applied to
. ..mere negligence or unintentional injury." Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly
Chargedfor Negligence Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARv. L. REV. 176, 178 (1898). As early as
1622, however, contribution was permitted among negligent joint tortfeasors. Arundel v. Gar-
diner, 79 Eng. Rep. 563 (K.B. 1622). The British abolished the rule against contribution alto-
gether in 1935. Law Reform Act, 24 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30, § 6(1) (1935). Although the first
American courts to address the issue followed the earlier British rule and only denied contri-
bution for intentional torts, e.g., Barley v. Bussing, 128 Conn. 455 (1859); Hunt v. Lane, 9 Ind.
248 (1857); later courts extended the doctrine to ban contribution regardless of the nature of
the tort. See W. PROSSER, supra note I, 305-06; Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Leflar].
among wrongdoers.' "12 Federal courts have unanimously followed
this rule in price fixing cases. 3 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, has recently recognized a right to contribution in a non
price fixing case.'" This comment will analyze the recent federal
court decisions addressing the issue of contribution in antitrust cases.
In addition, other areas of federal law in which courts have judicially
recognized a right to contribution among tortfeasors will be sur-
veyed. Finally, it will explore recent proposals to legislate a right of
contribution by amending the Clayton Act.
II. Recent Decisions - A Split Among the Circuits
A. Professional Beauty
In Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply,
Inc.,' 5 the first appellate decision on the issue, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals departed from the federal common law by recog-
nizing the right to contribution in antitrust cases. In the original suit,
Professional, a wholesaler of beauty supplies, charged that National,
a competitor, conspired to monopolize the market by demanding
that La Maur, a manufacturer of beauty products, grant it an exclu-
sive dealership in Minnesota. 16 In response to these demands, La
Maur terminated an existing dealership agreement with Profes-
sional.' 7
Although Professional based its claim for damages on an al-
leged conspiracy in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,' 8 it
brought suit solely against National. National filed a third-party
complaint against La Maur alleging that it was entitled to contribu-
tion if held liable to Professional.' 9 The third-party complaint was
12. Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 718 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Dole v. Dow
Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972)). The
rationale for denying contribution is analogous to the equitable defense of unclean hands.
Courts will not spend the time and energy to allocate losses resulting from the wrongdoer's
actions. Comment, Toward a Workable Rule of Contribution In The Federal Courts, 65 Co-
LUMBIA L. REV. 123, 124 (1965). See Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors,
21 CORNELL L.Q. 552 (1936); Jones, Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 175
(1958); Leflar, supra note 13, at 131-46.
13. See, e.g., Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) E-I (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1979); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,
939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-II (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979); El Camino Glass v.
Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
14. Professional Beauty Supply Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th
Cir. 1979). See notes 15-24 and accompanying text infra.
15. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
16. Id at 1181. Professional also alleged that the same actions violated Minnesota anti-
trust law, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325, 8014, 325, 8015 (1970), and tortiously interfered with its
business relationship with La Maur. Id
17. Id
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
19. 594 F.2d at 1181. National alleged that "'La Maur solicited National to become a
distributor of La Maur's products in the State of Minnesota' and that 'National had no respon-
sibility for, or control over La Maur's decision to terminate Professional.'" Id (quoting Na-
dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.2" The court of appeals reversed the dismissal
holding that "[tihe decision of whether a particular party is entitled
to contribution is best left to the trier of fact."'"
The original suit in Professional Beauty exemplifies plaintiff's
power to hold one tortfeasor liable for all damages in the absence of
a right to contribution. Professional attempted to collect treble dam-
ages from its competitor, a financially responsible party, while at the
same time retaining the good will of La Maur, the manufacturer, in
the hope of future business relations. Without contribution, La
Maur would have escaped liability because it possessed sufficient ec-
onomic influence to prevent Professional from naming it as a de-
fendant.22
Professional Beauty represents a judicial refusal to apply the
harsh common law rule of denying contribution. While previous
federal courts recognized the inequity in denying contribution in an-
titrust cases, they refused to change the traditional rule in hope of a
legislative response. 23  Some commentators felt that once Profes-
sional Beauty initiated a trend, other courts would follow. 24 This,
however, has not been the case.
B. Abraham
Declining to follow the "abrupt" action of the Eighth Circuit,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Wilson P. Abraham Construc-
tion Co. v. Texas Industries, Inc.,25 upheld a district court decision
tional's third-party complaint). National also sought indemnification from La Maur for the
full amount of damages since it was "at most secondarily liable." Id The court refused to
allow indemnification. Id at 1186-87.
20. Id at 1181. The motion was granted under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(6).
2 1. Id at 1186. The court further noted that although the flagrancy of the defendant's
conduct should be considered, the mere fact that the violation was intentional should not pre-
vent contribution. Id
22. "National claims that in their depositions the principal shareholders of Professional
stated that they were persuaded not to name La Maur as a defendant because of La Maur's
decision to renew Professional's franchise." Id at 1185.
The Supreme Court has noted this reluctance on the part of plaintiffs to bring suit against
business associates. "We recognize that direct purchasers sometimes may refrain from bring-
ing a treble-damages suit for fear of disrupting relations with their suppliers." Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977). See In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d
191, 198 (9th Cir. 1973); Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They WorkZ 61 CAL.
L. REV. 1319, 1325 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wheeler].
23. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) E-1, E-4 (10TH CIR. Nov. 15, 1979); WILSON P. ABRAHAM CONSTR. CORP. V. TEXAS
INDUS., INC., 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-I, F-4 (5th Cir. Oct. 25, 1979);
Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American Pres. Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
24. Bureau of National Affairs, Contribution - Fairness or Folly in Antitrust Litigation, 917
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 2 (June 12, 1979).
25. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-I (5th Cir. Oct. 25, 1979). Only two
district court cases had directly confronted the issue and both denied contribution. El Camino
Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre
Shipping Corp. v. American Pres. Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also
denying contribution in an antitrust case. The case arose from an
alleged conspiracy to raise and stabilize the price of ready-mix con-
crete in New Orleans.26 The alleged price fixing conspiracy con-
cerned four companies, of which only Texas Industries was sued.27
The district court, deferring to the "weight of authority" dis-
missed the third-party claim of defendant against the three cocon-
spirators.28 In affirming the dismissal, the court of appeals criticized
Professional Beauty for "abruptly jettison[ing] the limited prece-
dent" and undermining the deterrent purposes of private antitrust
actions.29 Finding a "rational relation" between the denial of contri-
bution and the implementation of the antitrust laws,30 the Fifth Cir-
cuit reaffirmed the common-law rule despite its potentially
inequitable results.
C. Olson
In Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,3t the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals declined to issue a declaratory judgment that de-
fendant Olson Farms was entitled to contribution. Fourteen egg
producers sued Olson Farms for being part of a price fixing conspir-
acy that kept the price the producers received for their eggs artifi-
cially low.3" Although Olson Farms caused the least amount of
damages, it was the only conspirator sued for treble damages.33
Bauglman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 671, 678 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 1975), aj'dandmodi-
fled on other grounds, 530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.),,cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976) (dictum); Wain-
wright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (implied); Washington v.
American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (S.D. Cal. 1968) (implied). But see
Chevalier v. Baird Sav. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140, 145 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (dictum).
26. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at F-i.
27. Texas Industries, along with Radcliff Materials, Inc., OKC Dredging, Inc., and
Jimco, Inc., was indicted for violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973).
The criminal proceedings were concluded upon the entry of nolo contendre pleas by all de-
fendants. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at F-I n.2.
28. Id at F-I.
29. Id Although the Abraham case concerned an intentional violation of the antitrust
laws, the court indicated that for contribution purposes, it would not distinguish between in-
tentional and unintentional violations.
"[Tihere appears to be no reason for drawing a distinction between intentional and unin-
tentional violators other than to insure equity in a particular case ... but we refuse to distort
the antitrust laws in order to remedy a problematic inequity." Id at F-4.
30. Although the court acknowledged that the question of contribution never occurred to
the drafters of the antitrust legislation, id at F-i, the court engaged in a due process and equal
protection analysis utilizing the "rational relation" standard accorded to economic legislation.
Id at F-4.
31. 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-I (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1979).
32. Id The producers specifically alleged damages caused by five egg buyers including
Olson Farms. Olson Farms purchased eggs from only three of fourteen plaintiffs. Its
purchases amounted to 11% of the total eggs sold by plaintiffs during the relevant period.
33. The claimed damages due to Olson Farms purchases amounted to $99,656. The
other four coconspirators allegedly caused the following amount of damages: Safeway Stores
($271,129); Egg Products Co. ($197,618); Snow White Egg Co. ($157,052); Countryside Farms
($119,961). Id
While the actual damage due to the purchases by Olson Farms was less than $100,000, a
judgment was entered against it for the full amount of damages caused by the conspiracy. The
Meanwhile, the four companies that caused the largest amount of
damages and therefore gained the most from the conspiracy were
relieved of any possible liability.
The Tenth Circuit, however, did not require a denial of contri-
bution in all antitrust cases. The court recognized a possible excep-
tion in the case of unintentional violators and in certain cases in
which extreme and undue hardship would be imposed on defend-
ants, provided that the enforcement of the antitrust objectives was
not frustrated.34
III. Federal Common Law of Contribution
A. Applicabilit) to Antitrust
Since the antitrust statutes do not mention a right to contribu-
tion, the three courts of appeals appropriately turned to the federal
common law. The substantial federal legislation concerning anti-
trust law and the need for national uniformity make the application
of state contribution laws inappropriate.35 While it is broadly stated
that no right to contribution among tortfeasors exists under federal
common law,36 courts applying federal law do impose contribution
total judgment paid by Olson Farms was in excess of $2.4 million, or more than twenty-four
times the actual damage it caused.
The unpublished judgment against Olson Farms was affirmed on appeal. Cackling Acres,
Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cis. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
34. 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-4 n. 15. Kline v. Coldwell, Banker &
Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974) is an example of a case falling within this exception. The
court refused to grant a class action certification because of the harsh results that might occur
due to joint and several liability. The case arose out of a price fixing scheme by real estate
brokers that allegedly caused $750 million in damage. For illustration, the court noted that if a
small business had overcharged $1000 "he becomes obligated to pay $3000 as treble damages.
But because he joined a realty board and received and followed suggestions as to proper com-
missions he is now obligated legally to pay $750 million. At some point the logic of the law
leads in this situation to an ad absurdum result." Id at 235. See Marks v. San Francisco Real
Estate Bd., 69 F.R.D. 353 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Larabee, supra note 7, at 526-28.
35. Contribution in federal antitrust cases raises an issue of substantive rights created
entirely by federal law.
When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and nature of
the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial
determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the answers to which are to be de-
rived from the statute and the federal policy which it has adopted. To the federal
statute and policy, conflicting state law and policy must yield.
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942). Although the courts are
free to adopt state law if it does not conflict with the policy of the antitrust laws, United States
v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1967), the majority of courts have favored a uniform
federal rule for contribution. Eg., Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Sup-
ply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1979); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., 11977-1
TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American Pres.
Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Corbett, Apportionment of Damages and Con-
tribution Among Coconspirators in Antitrust Treble Damages Actions, 31 FoRDHAm L. REV.
111, 123-29 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Corbett]; Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Suits,
63 CORNELL L. REV. 682, 687 n.31 (1978). Cf. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (applied state statute of limitations to antitrust action); Three
Rivers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 552 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1975) (applied state law to construe
a general release in antitrust case).
36. See note I 1 supra.
in certain situations.
B. Judicial Application of Contribution
1. Admiralty.-The first district courts to deny a right to con-
tribution in antitrust cases relied on the decision of the Supreme
Court in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.37 for
the proposition that, in the absence of legislation, no right to contri-
bution existed among tortfeasors under federal common law. 8 This
proposition, however, is based on misleading dicta in the case since
the party from whom contribution was sought was immune under a
federal compensation statute.39
The Supreme Court, in Cooper Stevedoring v. Kopke, Inc.,' re-
pudiated the dicta in Halcyon that questioned the wisdom of ex-
panding the right to contribution by stating the following: "[A]
'more equal distribution of justice' can best be achieved by amelio-
rating the common law rule against contribution which permits a
plaintiff to force one of two wrongdoers to bear the entire loss,
though the other may have been equally or more to blame."'" Pro-
fessional Beauty thus interpreted Cooper as providing "that under
certain circumstances the Supreme Court is willing to fashion a rule
allowing contribution without express direction from Congress.
42
37. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
38.
In the absence of legislation, courts exercising a common-law jurisdiction have
generally held that they cannot on their own initiative create an enforceable right of
contribution as between joint tortfeasors.
We have concluded that it would be unwise to attempt to fashion new judicial
rules of contribution and that the solution of this problem should await congressional
action.
342 U.S. at 285. See also El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] TRADE CASES (CCH)
61,533, at 72,111 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American Pres. Lines, 298 F.
Supp. 1339, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
39. In this case, Halcyon hired Haenn to repair its ship. An employee of Haenn was
injured and sued Halcyon for negligence. The court refused to allow Halcyon to implead
Haenn for contribution. Haenn was immune from direct tort liability to its employee because
it was covered by the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-950 (1976). Courts often protect the integrity of workmen's compensation statutes by
denying contribution. See 2A LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.21
(1976). If contribution were allowed, the immunity under the federal compensation act would
have been undermined.
40. 417 U.S. 106 (1974). In this case, Cooper loaded a ship operated by Kopke. A long-
shoreman, who was injured while loading additional cargo at the next port, sued Kopke for
negligence. The Court allowed Kopke to maintain a suit for contribution from Cooper. The
Court stated that '[slince [plaintiff] could have elected to make Cooper bear its share of the
damage caused by its negligence, we see no reason why the vessel should not be accorded the
same right." 1d at 113.
41. Id at 111 (quoting The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 14 (1890)).
42. 594 F.2d at 1183. For a general discussion of the Halcyon and Cooper cases see
Villareal, Halcyon to Ryan to Weyerhauser to Cooper - Where Do We Go From Herez 6 J. OF
MAR. L. & COM. 593 (1975).
2 Securities. -Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 provide express rights of contribution for
defendants.43 Courts, however, have recognized implied causes of
action under the antifraud sections of both enactments." Although
"express provisions in the Securities Acts do not automatically gov-
ern implied causes of action under the Acts, ' 45 the federal courts
have uniformily extended a right of contribution to suits brought
under an implied cause of action.4
While stating that their decision is partially based on an inpari
materia interpretation of the Securities Acts, courts also recognize
that the allowance of contribution is supported by strong policy con-
siderations.47 Although the Olson and Abraham antitrust cases re-
fused to accept the securities cases as a "compelling analogy, ' 48 the
cases, nonetheless, exemplify the willingness of federal courts to ex-
tend the right to contribution beyond congressionally defined limits.
3. Aviation. -Under authority of the Federal Aviation Act of
195841 courts have interpreted the rights and liabilities of parties in
suits arising from mid-air collisions to be governed by federal law.50
Although the Act is silent on the question of contribution, the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. 51
rejected
as being outmoded and entirely unsatisfactory, the contention that
43. Contribution clauses are found in Section 1 I() of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f)
(1971), and Sections 9(e) and 18(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(b) (1971).
44. See Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1971), and Sections 10(b) and
14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ j(b), 78n(a) (1971).
45. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 169 n.14 (D. Del. 1974).
46. See, e.g., Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp.
230 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Leggett & Meyers, Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Ser., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); deHass v. Empire
Petrol. Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Col. 1968). See generally 3 Loss, SECUuTIES REGULATION
1739-40 (1961).
47. The court in Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Service, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), stated that "[d]eparting from the rugged flintiness of traditional common law, the gen-
eral drift of the law today is toward the allowance of contribution among joint tortfeasors."
Id at 957. "In short, recent developments in the common law of contribution, as well as the
text and policies of the Securities Acts, militate in favor of the availability of contribution."
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S.Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 169 (D. Del. 1974). See generally
Ruder, Multple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding andAbetting, Conspiracy, In
Pari Delicto, Indemn'Fcation and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972).
48. "[T]he 'analogy' . . . falters. . . since Congress expressly provided for contribution
within the framework of the securities laws and, thus, established a policy that contribution is
. ..consistent with observance and enforcement of the securities laws." Olson Farms, Inc. v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-l, E-2 (10th Ci. Nov. 15,
1979). The Abraham court maintained that the securities cases are merely an example of "the
general principle that the securities laws are to be administered in pari materia." 936 ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at F-3. See generally Fisher, Contribution in lOb-S Actions,
33 Bus. LAW. 1821 (1973).
49. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1489 (1970).
50. See, e.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 978 (1975); In re Paris Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
51. 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
the federal rule should be one of "no contribution".... There is
an obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the
entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally,
unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered on to one alone, ac-
cording to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the exist-
ence of liability insurance, the plaintiffs' whim or spite, or his
collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot
free.
5 2
The Seventh Circuit has, therefore, judicially modified the
traditional federal common-law rule to allow contribution for unin-
tentional torts in aviation cases.
53
4. Civil Rights. -Federal courts allow contribution in cases
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196414 although no right is
expressly granted in the statute. In Stevenson v. International Paper
Co.,55 a sex discrimination action for back pay based on a discrimi-
natory collective bargaining agreement, the district court decided
that since the company and the union were joint tortfeasors "the ulti-
mate financial burden of back pay liability should be apportioned
through the assertion of cross claims of contribution or indemnity
between the unions and the company. 56 The Abraham court, how-
ever, specifically refused to accept the civil rights cases as authority
to "discard an established rule of law" because none of the cases
expressed their rationale for allowing a right to contribution under
federal law.5 7
5. District of Columbia. -Federal courts, deciding local federal
common law for the District of Columbia,5" have consistently per-
mitted contribution among unintentional tortfeasors. In Washington
Gaslight Company v. District of Columbia,59 plaintiff filed a negli-
52. Id at 405 (quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 1 at § 50). The court adopted a compara-
tive negligence system to divide the damages among the negligent parties. Id
53. Although denying a general right to contribution, the Olson court recognized that the
reasoning and holding of Kohr would be applicable to antitrust cases involving unintentional
tortfeasors. 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at E-2, E-4. See notes 31-32 and
accompanying text supra.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). See, e.g., Stevenson v. International Paper Co.,
432 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. La. 1977); Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Va. 1973); Blanton v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 49 F.R.D. 162 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
55. 432 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. La. 1977).
56. Id at 408.
57. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at F-3. See notes 25-26 and accompany-
ing text supra.
58. The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "to exercise exclusive leg-
islation in all cases whatsoever" over the District of Columbia. U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 17.
59. 161 U.S. 316 (1896). In a later negligence case concerning an automobile accident,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated the following: "Wie adopt
for the District of Columbia, without exception or reservation, the rule. . . 'that when the
parties are not intentional and wilful wrongdoers, but are made so by legal inference or intend-
ment, contribution may be enforced."' Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1949)
(quoting George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1942)).
gence action against the District for damage from a defective gas box
installed by the Gaslight Company. Although the District was held
liable for breach of its duty to abate all nuisances, it was given a
remedy against its joint tortfeasor, the Gaslight Company. The court
maintained that "where the offense is merely malum prohibitum,
and is in no respect immoral, it is not against the policy of the law to
inquire into the relative delinquency of the parties, and to administer
justice between them, although both parties are wrongdoers."6 The
court further noted that their decision "qualifies and restrains within
just limits the rigor of the rule which forbids recourse between
wrongdoers."'"
IV. Antitrust Contribution - Policy Considerations
A. Congressional Intent
No statutory right to contribution exists under the antitrust
laws. Several courts denying contribution have perceived congres-
sional intent to exclude the right.62 In Olson, the court reasoned that
"the fact that Congress made no mention of contribution whatsoever
in the antitrust laws. . . although it expressly legislated contribution
in the securities laws, suggests that contribution in cases arising
under the antitrust laws was not intended."63 This rationale, how-
ever, is unpersuasive. The Supreme Court has stated that "[ilt is at
best trecherous to find in congressional silence the adoption of a con-
trolling rule of law."'
The better view, as expressed in Abraham, is that the question
of contribution probably never occurred to the drafters of the anti-
trust legislation.65 No discussion of the matter exists in the legisla-
tive histories of the Acts or their amendments. In this situation, the
court should seek to ascertain "what Congress 'would have intended
on a point not present to its mind, if the point had been present.' 
66
Professional Beauty viewed the presence of contribution in the secur-
60. 161 U.S. at 328. The Court stated that the rule "is not predictated on the peculiar or
exceptional rights of municipal corporations. It is general in its nature." Id at 328.
61. Id at 327.
62. See, e.g., Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) E-1, E-2 (10th Cit. Nov. 15, 1979); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1]
TRADE CASES (CCH) $ 61,533 at 72,111 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American
Pres. Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
63. 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at E-2. Congressional silence is more
persuasive when it follows a lengthy judicial development of the law. The court in [Profes-
sional Beauty observed that "there is a dearth of case law on this issue and comment that a
complicated legal issue which is raised so infrequently is unlikely to spur immediate congres-
sional action." 594 F.2d at 1184. Reliance on congressional silence for a positive intent to
deny contribution presents a weak justification for the courts' decisions.
64. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
65. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at F-2. See notes 25-26 and accompany-
ing text .supra.
66. Id (quoting B. CARoozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 15 (1949)).
ities laws as "some indication that if the question were presented
today, Congress would include a right to contribution as part of the
antitrust laws."67 This reasoning is reinforced by recent legislative
proposals to amend the Clayton Act in response to the judicial inter-
pretation of congressional intent.
68
B. Interference with Plaintifs Control Over the Litigation
Nearly all courts agree that the right to contribution threatens
plaintiff's ability to control the size and scope of the litigation. A
fear exists that contribution would be used as a defensive tool by
defendants to complicate the case. 69 A plaintiff with a shallow pock-
et may wish to limit its case to a few small defendants,70 but if de-
fendants are permitted to implead larger, more powerful tortfeasors,
with the corresponding increase in expensive discovery, plaintiff
could find its small suit transformed into a massive, complex case.
The Supreme Court has cautioned federal courts "not [to] add
requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifi-
cally set forth by Congress in [the antitrust] laws."'" Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois,72 illustrates this recent attempt by the Supreme Court
to simplify antitrust litigation. The creation of additional mini-trials
to determine shares of contribution, however, seems to defeat the
Court's objective.
Professional Beauty, alternatively, recognized that the problem
of plaintiff's suit growing out of control can be alleviated by Rule
67. 594 F.2d at 1183-84.
68. See notes 116-23 and accompanying text infra.
69. "Of particular concern.., is the potential for confusion, delay, and complexity in-
herent in permitting antitrust defendants a right to implead other alleged antitrust viola-
tors. . . . (PIlaintiff may simply be overwhelmed by embroilment in a lawsuit of a scope and
size it never contemplated and is ill-equipped to handle." Professional Beauty Supply Inc. v.
National Beauty Supply Inc., 594 F.2d at 1190 (Hanson, J., dissenting). See Sabre Shipping
Corp. v. American President Lines, 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Not all plaintiff's attorneys, however, fear a defensive use of contribution. One plaintiffs
attorney has stated that, from the standpoint of a litigator, contribution among antitrust de-
fendants should be endorsed as an offensive tool. Salzman, Debate on Availability of Contri-
bution, ABA, Section of Antitrust Law, Private Antitrust Litigation Committee (Aug. 13,
1979), summarized in 928 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-16 (Aug. 23, 1979). To
illustrate, Mr. Salzman offered the following hypothetical:
After learning of an indictment charging ten manufacturers with price fixing, a
purchaser discovers that its purchases of the product were from four unindicted man-
ufacturers and two indicted manufacturers; an appropriate strategy would be to file a
complaint naming only the two indicted manufacturers. Through the use of this di-
vide-and-conquer strategy ... a plaintiffs counsel will place the burden on defend-
ants' counsel to find out all the facts, and to bring in the other six manufacturers.
Once a defense counsel discovers all facts, he'll have to disclose them early in the
litigation through well-drafted interrogatories.
Id
70. As a practical matter these "limited" cases are not common. "[lit is a common prac-
tice for an antitrust plaintiff to join as many defendants as may reasonably be expected to be
liable, with a view to insuring full recovery." Corbett, supra note 35 at 111.
71. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
72. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See note 108 and accompanying text infra.
42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.73 Rule 42(b) allows
the trial court to sever parties or issues if necessary to protect plain-
tiff's rights. This permits the court to prevent inequitable uses of
contribution by returning the case to its original dimensions.
Since the tortfeasors are still jointly and severally liable, plain-
tiff can still recover the entire amount of damages from the defend-
ants it originally chose to sue. A preferable view is that a joint
judgment need not exist against the additional tortfeasors in order
for defendants to obtain contribution.74 The second suit, caused by
severance under Rule 42(b) would not affect plaintiff. It would
merely be a suit between the tortfeasors for a sharing of the liability.
The court in Abraham argued that since the availability of sev-
erance is discretionary with the trial court a plaintiff contemplating
action will have no assurances that the suit will remain at its original
dimensions.75 Nonetheless, plaintiffs in private antitrust suits tradi-
tionally have been accorded the status of "private attorneys general"
because of their important role in enforcing the antitrust laws.7 6 A
plaintiff contemplating an antitrust suit would have no reason to pre-
sume that the trial judge would allow the case to become more com-
plex. Liberal application of Rule 42(b) would adequately protect
plaintiffs from an abusive exercise of the right to contribution.
C Effect on Settlements
The court in Professional Beauty recognized that the handling of
73. 594 F.2d at 1184. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) provides: "The court, in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and
economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party
claim..."
If separate trials are deemed appropriate, the trial judge may also limit discovery to the
segregated issues. See Ellingson Timber Co. v. Great N. Ry., 424 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); Ford Motor Co. v. Milby, 210 F.2d 137, 139 (4th Cir. 1954);
Pegram, Separate Trials in Patent-Antitrust and Patent- Unenforceability Litigation, 64 F.R.D.
185, 196 (1975).
74. See Herzfield v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), a securities case, in which the court stated that requiring the circuitous proce-
dural mechanism of joint judgment and payment by one tortfeasor before allowing contribu-
tion is unwarranted in light of litigation costs. Id at 135. Furthermore, under FED. R. Civ. P.
54(b), the original plaintiff can obtain a final judgment on his claim even if the separate claims
for contribution are still pending.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there
is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
ld
75. "[Pjrivate plaintiffs may derive cold comfort from 'the mere possibility of the
favorable uses of district court discretion.'" 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at F-
4 (quoting Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at 1190
(Hanson, J., dissenting)).
76. The private treble damage action has been described as the very cornerstone of anti-
trust enforcement. Loeringer, Private Action - The Strongest Pillar o/Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST
BULL. 167 (1958). See note 95 infra
settlements presents one of the greatest problems in allowing contri-
bution." Three conflicting policies prevent easy solutions. First,
out-of-court settlements should be encouraged; second, plaintiff
should be made whole; and last, an equitable distribution of liability
should result.
When fewer than all defendants settle with plaintiff, the court
must determine what effect the amount paid in settlement will have
on the nonsettling defendant's judgment. A court has four options in
an antitrust case. First, allow no reduction for the settlement
amount;78 second, deduct the settlement amount from the actual
damages; 79 third, deduct the settlement amount from the trebled
damages;80 or last, reduce the judgment by the proportion of dam-
ages attributed to the settling defendant.
81
The vast majority of courts have followed the case of Flintkole v.
Lysfjord82 by adopting the third option. Assume, for example,
Company A and Company B are antitrust coconspirators that injure
77. 594 F.2d at 1184.
78. While this option would provide a great incentive for plaintiffs to settle, it is doubtful
that any court would accept it. Plaintiffs would be allowed multiple recoveries for the same
damages and the chances of collusive agreements between plaintiffs and defendants would be
greatly increased. See Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1968); W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, at 304-05. See generally Note, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV.
486 (1966).
79. Judge Learned Hand has stated that in treble damage actions "two thirds of the re-
covery is not remedial and inevitably presupposes a punitive purpose." Lyons v. Westing-
house Elect. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). If the
settlement amount is deducted from the actual damages it will reduce the punitive portion of
the recovery. Since joint tortfeasors are liable for the entire amount of damages, including
punitive damages, courts have refused to lower plaintiffs recovery by eliminating a portion of
the punitive damages. Baughman v. Cooper Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 534 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Flintkote v. Lysfjord, 246 F.22 368, 397-98 (9th Cir. 1957); Wain-
wright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
80. See note 82 and accompanying text infra
81. See note 90 and accompanying text infra. The court must determine the appropriate
proportion by which to reduce the judgment. While the court in Professional Beauty did not
address this question, it did adopt the pro rata rule for contribution. The pro rata reduction
rule is based on the idea that "equality is equity." W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 310. When
tortfeasors settle, the judgment is reduced by the fraction arrived at by dividing the number of
settling tortfeasors by the total number of tortfeasors. See Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465,
468 (3d Cir. 1968). Professional Beauty chose the pro rata rule "[b]ecause of the administrative
difficulties of assessing exact percentages of fault in complicated antitrust actions." 594 F.2d at
1182 n.4. Although the court's decision to allow contribution was based on fairness between
the parties, id at 1185, the simplistic equal division of damages is justified in this case. Profes-
sional Beauty concerned the conspiracy of two intentional violators, both of whom were neces-
sary for the scheme to work, and neither of whom benefited more than the other in an easily
determinable amount. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Co., [1977-21 TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,568
(3d Cir. 1977); Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See generally Corbett,
supra note 35, at 138-39.
A more equitable method of handling settlements is to reduce the judgment by a propor-
tion equal to the relative responsibility of the settling tortfeasor for plaintiffs damages. This
approach gives the courts flexibility in reducing the judgment. For the mechanics of the rela-
tive responsibility method, see note 113 infra. See also United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,
421 U.S. 397 (1975); Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1968); Doyle v. United States,
441 F. Supp. 701 (D.C. 1977).
82. 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 19750. See, e.g., Baughman v. Cooper Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d
529, 534 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Wainwright v, Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9,
Company P. The damages attributable to Company .4 are $100,000
and the damages attributable to Company B are $10,000. Company
A settles with Company P for $30,000. If Company B goes to court
and is found liable for the entire $110,000 damage, Company Bs
judgment will be the trebled amount ($330,000) minus the amount
paid by Company 4. This option makes plaintiff whole and encour-
ages settlements, but at the cost of potentially inequitable results.
A plaintiff in an antitrust suit settling with fewer than all de-
fendants, is not required to engage in the normal process of assessing
the potential recovery and the chances of prevailing over the settling
defendant.8 3 The plaintiff is, therefore, not taking a gamble or sell-
ing part of its claim. As long as other viable defendants remain in
the case, the plaintiff may receive full damages regardless of the set-
tlement amount. This method encourages collusion between plain-
tiffs and defendants. Since the plaintiff will be fully compensated by
the nonsettling defendants, it will be more responsive to offers of
"sweetheart settlements." 84 One commentator has also noted a new
antitrust strategy in which "the defendant typically gives the plaintiff
various 'business advantages' . . . in lieu of a monetary settle-
ment.""5  The plaintiff, therefore, may settle with a defendant who
offers noncompensatory "business advantages" and place the entire
financial liability on the nonsettling defendants.
A problem arises if nonsettling defendants are allowed to im-
plead settling defendants for contribution. If the settling defendant
can be brought back into the case, it loses incentive to settle in the
first place. It would thus be to a defendant's advantage to forego
settlement and defend the case in the hope of a more favorable judg-
ment.8 6 Since no one could buy their way out of the law suit, the
policy favoring early out-of-court settlements would be thwarted.
Although a rule allowing contribution under the present system
would discourage settlements, a rule preventing contribution in all
11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See generally Note, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV.
486 (19660.
83. See generally ANTITRUST ADVISOR §§ 11.74-11.85 (C. HILLS ed. 1978); Note, An
Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REV. 67 (1969); Note, Settlement Devices with Joint
Tortfeasor, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 762 (1973).
84. See Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1968).
85. Austin, Negative Effects of Treble Damage Actions." Rflections on the New Antitrust
Strategy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1353 [hereinafter cited as Austin]. The author suggests that many
private treble damage suits are brought "to intimidate defendants into modifying their conduct
in a way favorable to the interests of the plaintiff." Id at 1353. The effectiveness of these non
compensatory oriented suits depends on the ambiguities of antitrust precedent and the tremen-
dous risk of defending an antitrust suit. Id
86. See Doyle v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 701 (D.S.C. 1977), which notes that it would
be unfair to assess a portion of the damages to and require contribution from a settling defend-
ant because it was unable to participate in the trial. The court suggested that "an unscrupulous
plaintiff and non-settling defendant could agree to shape the evidence at the trial so that the
majority of fault was attributed to the settling defendant who could not defend himself." Id
at 712 n.5.
cases often leads to inequitable settlements. Without contribution,
settlement becomes more than a choice, it becomes a necessity for
small defendants. If they do not settle early, small defendants take
the risk that other defendants will settle, leaving them with a huge
judgment. The longer a defendant resists settlement, the greater the
amount the plaintiff will require it to pay.87 Therefore, a small de-
fendant's right to trial becomes meaningless. Even if it has a defense
or believes it is not guilty, a small defendant is economically coerced
into settlement since a loss at trial could mean financial ruin.88
Although the settlement issue was not present in Professional
Beauty, the court assumed that subsequent courts would be able to
fashion a rule to protect both settling and nonsettling defendants.89
Little Rock School District v. Borden,9 ° construing Professional
Beauty, adopted a method of "carving out" the settling defendants
damages from a class action suit. The court stated that it would ap-
prove proposed settlements only if they released all nonsettling de-
fendants from joint liability for settling defendants' damages and
also released settling defendants from liability for contribution.9 If
the Little Rock rule were extended to all antitrust cases, defendants
would not be deterred from settlement. Since nonsettling defendants
could not implead them for contribution, settling defendants could
effectively buy their way out of the suit.
From plaintiff's perspective, however, a deterrent to settlement
would exist under the Little Rock rule. Settlement would mean less
total damages recoverable by plaintiff.92 Small defendants would
87. In the Corrugated Container class action antitrust litigation, plaintiffs used a "whip-
saw game theory" to break defendants ranks by offering to settle at a discount with a few early
settlers to pressure the other defendants to settle at a higher price due to their greater damage
exposure. One of the defendants, Green Bay Packaging, a small, unindicted family owned
business was forced to settle at a rate of three and one-half times greater than a company that
had pleaded nolo contendre to previous criminal charges and that had a market share nearly
five times greater. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT ON ANTITIUST EQUAL ENFORCEMENT
ACT OF 1979 (S. 1468), S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., ist Sess. 14-17 (1979).
88. The Chairman of Green Bay Packaging, Mr. Kress, in testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee stated the following: "[W]e concluded that we must stand ready to bear
the burden of a potential legal liability of $5 billion if we followed our original decision to
defend our innocence of any civil antitrust liability .... This ... would wipe out or entire
equity." Id The Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that
[iut had become two expensive to litigate. That cannot be the obective of any
system of justice. Clearly, when the legal system, which is set up to resolve disputes
so that the responsible bear the burden and the innocent go free, does not allow a
determination of liability to be based on guilt or innocence, but on the factors of
strength and bigness instead, it is time to readjust the system.
Id
89. See 594 F.2d at 1184.
90. 937 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-30 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 1, 1979).
91. Id See note 81 supra.
92. "The better rule ... is to respect the aleatory nature of the settlement process and to
hold both the plaintiff and settling defendant to their gamble." Doyle v. United States, 441 F.
Supp. 701, 711 n.5 (D.S.C. 1977). No public policy exists against releasing antitrust claims,
Schott Enter., Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., 520 F.2d 1298 (6th Cir. 1975); Duffy Theaters, Inc. v. Grif-
fith Consol. Theaters, Inc., 208 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954).
also be less inclined to settle once the economic coercion is elimi-
nated. Arguably, however, the only settlements that would be de-
terred are the inequitable ones.9 3 But even if this were not so, the
Supreme Court has noted that it would not continue to divide dam-
ages equally in admiralty cases because
it asks us to continue the operation of an archaic rule because its
facile application out of the court yields quick, though inequitable
settlements, and relieves the court of some litigation. Congestion
in the courts cannot justify a legal rule that produces unjust results
in litigation simply to encourage speedy out-of-court settle-
ments. 
4
D. Effect on Enforcement of Antitrust Laws
Absent a right to contribution, an antitrust violator faces a
smaller probability of being held liable, but its potential damage lia-
bility is much greater. Allowing contribution increases the likeli-
hood that all violators will be required to pay a part of the judgment,
but decreases the likelihood that any one violator will be required to
pay a sum greatly in excess of the damages it caused.
In deciding between these alternative approaches, the courts in
Abraham and Olson Farms placed the burden on defendants seeking
contribution to show that it would benefit the effective enforcement
of the antitrust laws.95 The court in Abraham noted that the prevail-
ing economic theory supports the idea that business managers are
"risk averse" and therefore are deterred more by the smaller possi-
bility of a huge loss than by a surer smaller loss.96 Like most deci-
sions, however, Abraham concluded that arguments on both sides of
the deterrence question are inconclusive.97
Professional Beauty adopted a different position regarding the
93. The Supreme Court, in adopting comparative negligence for admiralty cases stated
that "experience with comparative negligence in the personal injury area teaches that a rule of
fairness in court will produce fair out-of-court settlements." United States v. Reliable Transfer
Co., 421 U.S. 397, 408 (1975).
94. Id
95. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) E-1, E-3 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1979); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus.,
Inc., 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-I, F-2, F-4 (5th Cir. Oct. 25, 1979).
96. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at F-2. The expected value of a loss is
equal to the amount of the expected loss multiplied by the probability of the loss. For exam-
ple, if the probability of a small loss is ten times greater than the probability of a large loss,
they will have the same expected value if the large loss is ten times greater in amount than the
small loss. Given these two alternatives, with the same expected values, the questions be-
comes, which loss will deter the tortfeasor the most. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTI-
TRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 120-29 (1976) [hereinafter cited as K.
ELZINGA & W. BREIT]. It is generally accepted theory that business managers are risk averse -
deterred more by the alternative that provides the most risk. Managers are dedicated to sys-
tematic research and planning in order "to minimize uncertainty, to minimize the conse-
quences of uncertainty, or both." R. MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL"
CAPITALISM 232 (1964). See also J. K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (2d ed.
1971); R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION (1961).
97. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at F-2.
deterrence question. Faced with the potential of a grossly unfair re-
sult, the court shifted the burden to the party seeking to maintain the
system to show that it was necessary to further the objectives of the
antitrust laws.98 The court found more support for the notion that
greater deterrence results from a lesser probability of escaping liabil-
ity.99 This is especially true when a defendant is powerful enough to
coerce the plaintiff. Several Supreme Court decisions that equate ef-
fective antitrust deterrence with depriving violators of "the fruits of
their illegality" support the Professional Beauty determination.'00
Abraham determined that it was possible to deter even uninten-
tional violators.' 0 ' The court observed that people tend to vigor-
ously avoid any possible violation. If contribution were allowed for
unintentional violators, the court reasoned that people would tend to
engage in conduct bordering on illegality assured that they could
claim that any violation was unintentional. An inherent weakness in
this rationale is that the cotortfeasors, against whom contribution is
sought, have both the interest and the ability to show that a violation
was intentional.' 02 Furthermore, the denial of contribution for unin-
tentional violators may result in a deterrence of legitimate business
98. 594 F.2d at 1185. "The arguments on either side of the deterrence question are at
best inconclusive. The deterrence argument, therefore, is an inadequate reason for rejecting a
rule designed to achieve fairness among parties." 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
at F-5 (Morgan, J., dissenting).
99. 594 F.2d at 1185. "jOin balance a rule allowing contribution is actually a greater
deterrent. . . . To deny contribution would be to dilute the deterrent effect of the antitrust
laws, since a participant in an antitrust violation could escape all responsibility for its wrong-
doing." Id Professional Beauty has strong support from the securities cases.
The policy underlying the securities laws is not frustrated by permitting contri-
bution. Rather, that policy is reinforced. Contribution. . .does not permit a wrong-
doer to escape loss by shifting the entire responsibility for damage to another party.
Instead, it apportions the loss among the joint wrongdoers so that the deterrent effect
of the judgment will be felt by all culpable parties.
Herzfield v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 135 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
100. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), in which the Supreme
Court stated "that § 4 of the Clayton Act has two purposes: to deter violators and deprive
them of 'the fruits of their illegality,' and to 'compensate victims of antitrust violations for their
injuries.'" Id at 314. The Supreme Court, however, has adopted inconsistent positions con-
cerning which is the predominant purpose of the two. Compare Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) (Section 4 essentially remedial although deterrence
is also important) with Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) and Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) (increased deterrence at the expense of
uncompensated plaintiffs). See generallv K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 96, at 66-72.
Even if deterrence is the predominate purpose of Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1971), an automatic deterrent effect exists since the damages are treble. Professor Dobbs
has stated that "[slince damages are trebled, there is quite a sufficient quantum of liability to
punish. . . all wrongdoers by forcing them to share the liability." D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITITON, § 10.7 at 704 (1973). If increased
deterrence is needed, however, a more equitable method would be to either increase the crimi-
nal sanctions or to increase the damage multiplier instead of randomly increasing the multipli-
cand. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 96, at 65.
101. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at F-4.
102. Id at F-5 (Morgan, J., dissenting).
operations. The better view, as recognized by Professional Beauty
and Olson Farms, is that when the violation is unintentional very
little potential for deterrence exists."°3
E. Fundamental Fairness
In allowing contribution, Professional Beauty stated the follow-
ing:
The deciding factor in our decision is fairness between the par-
ties .... There is an obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule
which permits the entire burden of restitution of a loss to be
placed upon one alone because of the plaintiff's whim or spite, or
his collusion with the other wrongdoer.'04
Without contribution, the wrongdoers not joined by plaintiff are un-
justly enriched to the extent that they benefited from the violation
and are permitted to retain the "fruits of their illegality."'0 5 The in-
equity becomes more apparent in cases in which the defendants
making restitution are fringe members of the violation, such as pas'
sive,l' or late-comer defendants.107
The Supreme Court has expressed concern regarding the expo-
sure of antitrust defendants to multiple liability. In Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois,'0 8 the Court denied standing to indirect victims of anti-
trust violations even though they had suffered damages. The mid-
dleman, who deals directly with the violator, is the only party
granted standing in these cases. Concerned primarily about the
complexity of determining the amount of damage to indirect victims,
the Court also stated its opposition to creating a possibility of dupli-
103. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) E- 1, E-4 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1979); Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty
Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1979).
104. 594 F.2d at 1185-86.
105. Although defendant in Olson Farms raised a claim of unjust enrichment, the court
determined "that the claim of unjust enrichment was but an expression of the claim for contri-
bution." 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at E-1.
106. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
"[D]amages ...may be recovered from either or both defendants without regard to their
relative responsibility for originating the combination or their different roles in effectuating its
ends." Id at 144 (White, J., concurring).
107. The general rule is that one who joins an on-going conspiracy is equally culpable
with the original members and is liable for damages previously caused by the conspiracy re-
gardless of whether he knew about them at the time he joined the conspiracy, See, e.g., Baugh-
man v. Cooper Jarrett, 391 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Pa. 1975), afl'd and mod#Yed on other grounds,
530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976).
108. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S.
481 (1968), the Court rejected an argument that the direct purchaser from the violator had
suffered no damages since he had "passed on" the increased costs to his customers. The Court
was concerned that the middleman in this type of case might be the only party with sufficient
interest to bring suit. Id In Illinois Brick, the Court provided the corollary rule that the "pass-
on" theory could not be used "offensively." If the Court had abided by the Hanover Shoe
decision and allowed the middleman to collect full damages and also allowed the indirect.
victims to receive damages, the defendant would be exposed to potentially duplicative judg-
ments.
cative liability. °9 It is therefore very difficult to justify a denial of
contribution when plaintiffs are fully compensated and one defend-
ant is charged with multiple liability.
V. Approaches to Contribution in Antitrust Cases
A. Legislation
Most courts addressing the issue of whether to allow contribu-
tion in antitrust cases have indicated a preference for awaiting con-
gressional direction."i 0 Four approaches to legislating a right to
contribution have been suggested:
1. American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law. -The
Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association has recom-
mended a comprehensive"' legislative approach that would allow
contribution in all antitrust cases." 2 The amount of contribution
would be based on the relative responsibility of each defendant for
plaintifi's damages.' 13 The proposal, therefore, rejects the Profes-
sional Beauty per capita division of damages in favor of a more flex-
ible approach that considers the defendant's impact and culpability.
To prevent defendants from improperly joining parties to complicate
the case, the ABA's proposal would allow contribution only against
those parties whose alleged wrongful acts are the subject of plaintiff's
damage claim.' 1
4
109. "[Proponents of... allowing standing for indirect victims ultimately fall back on
the argument that it is better for the defendant to pay sixfold or more damages than for an
injured party to go uncompensated. . . . We do not find this risk acceptable." 431 U.S. at 731
n. 11. Although the chance of multiple liability was small in Illinois Brick, the Court thus
preferred having uncompensated plaintiffs over multiple liability for defendants.
110. See, e.g., Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) E-l, E-4 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1979). "We believe this court should await a clear
signal. . . from the legislative branch of our government on this matter .... Congress ... is
in a far superior and more appropriate position to gauge the impact on observance and en-
forcement of the antitrust laws from contribution." Id
11. The advantage of a comprehensive legislative approach is that it provides a basis for
decisional uniformity. Resolution of the current problems could ts be quickly achieved. Im-
mediate guidance, however, could also be achieved through a decision by the Supreme Court.
See notes 141-42 infra
112. The Section of Antitrust Law adopted the proposed legislation on August 17, 1979.
Pursuant to ABA procedure, the Section sought "blanket authority" from the Board of Gover-
nors. "Blanket authority" was denied due to an objection by the Section of Insurance, Negli-
gence and Compensation Law. The proposed legislation is therefore only endorsed by the
Section of Antitrust Law. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at A-8 (Oct. 25, 1979).
113. The definition of "relative responsibility" adopted by the section varies with the type
of violation. In price fixing cases "relative responsibility would normally be measured by sales
in dollars or in units, taking into account the amount of overcharge, but also taking into ac-
count the extensiveness of the violation, its duration, and the transactions affected." Resolu-
tions and Report of the Section of Antitrust Law of the ABA, reported in 936 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at E-4 (Oct. 25, 1979). "In other cases, where relative sales to the
plaintiff would not be appropriate or even relevant, the standard we propose would permit the
use of relative culpability or fault. . . as the measure adopted by the court." Id
114. This approach provides plaintiffs with an effective way of limiting the size of their
case. Unless the plaintiff alleges damages caused by a nondefendant, defendant would not be
The legislation would require that contribution be denied in an
action by or against a settling defendant. ' 5 Upon settlement, the
plaintiff would have the option of either reducing the claim by re-
moving the settling defendant's acts from the theory of injury, or
having the final judgment reduced by the amount of the settling de-
fendants obligation for contribution.
2. Senate Bill 1468.-Senate Bill 1468,116 which is currently on
the Senate floor, provides legislative guidelines to allow contribution
in price fixing violations. Determining that price fixing cases "pres-
ent the most serious problems in need of immediate congressional
attention." 1 7 the bill provides a rigid formula to determine each
price fixer's share of the damage. To avoid the additional complex-
ity of determining relative culpability, the bill apportions damages
according to the relative benefit each defendant received as mea-
sured by its sales or purchases."18 The bill specifically retains joint
and several liability to assure full compensation to plaintiffs in case a
defendant is insolvent or not subject to process. ' 9
Although the bill denies a right of contribution from good faith
settling defendants, it removes their share of the sales from the judg-
ment. The nonsettling defendants will therefore be required to pay
only treble the damages attributable to their own sales or
purchases. 
1 20
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on Senate Bill 1468121
expressly provides that although the proposed act is limited to price
able to implead the nondefendant for contribution. Under this approach, defendants would
only be held liable for the damages they caused and the small plaintiff would be able to limit
his case. Id at E-3.
115. To avoid contribution, a settling defendant would be required to advise the court and
all other defendants of the settlement within 60 days. The settling defendant would be barred
from seeking contribution based on its settlement since the other defendants would have no
part in the settlement. Id at E-3, E-4.
116. Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979, S. 1468, 96 Cong., 1st Sess. § 41 (1979)
(introduced by Senator Birch Bayh).
117. S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979). The appropriateness of limiting con-
tribution to price fixing cases is questionable. Although price fixing cases comprise the major-
ity of private antitrust actions, see Long, Damages as an Instrumentfor Redirecting Antitrust
Policy, 7 CUMB. L. REV. 413-28 (1977), some of the most compelling situations in which con-
tribution is needed, such as in Professional Beauty, concern non price fixing cases.
118. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(a) (1979).
119. Id § 41(d). This assures a full recovery by the plaintiff. "The rule in equity ...
based on the maxim that equality is equity, is that the common liability must be apportioned
among the solvent co-obligators." Moody v. Kirkpatrick, 234 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Tenn.
1964).
120. When a plaintiff settles with a defendant, the court would be required to reduce the
plaintiffs claim by the greatest of (1) any amount stipulated by the release, (2) the amount of
consideration paid for the release, or (3) treble the actual damages attributable to the settling
defendant's actual sales or purchases. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(b) (1979). In the
usual case, the last option would be the greatest. This "carve-out" formula is analogous to the
rule adopted in Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 937 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) A-II (E.D. Ark. Oct. 1, 19790. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
121. S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
fixing cases this implies "no intention of precluding the courts from
developing contribution in non-price-fixing cases where case-by-case
judicial flexibility is required." ' 2 The bill, therefore, creates the
ironic situation that intentional price fixers are automatically entitled
to contribution regardless of the degree of their culpability, while
unintentional non price fixing defendants may be denied contribu-
tion. I "
3. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Acts. -- Congress
could adopt a legislative system similar to the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act. The original 1939 Act'2 4 , which has been
adopted by ten states, 125 provides a right to contribution for both
intentional and unintentional tortfeasors.' 26 The 1939 Act prevents
collusion between plaintiffs and defendants by refusing to allow a
plaintiff to release one tortfeasor from his fair share of liability.
127
Since the right to contribution would be allowed against settling de-
fendants, settlements would be greatly deterred. This alone makes
the 1939 Act unacceptable for antitrust cases.
The 1955 Act, 128 which has been adopted in nine states, 129 elim-
inated the right to contribution for intentional tortfeasors. Uninten-
tional tortfeasors are given a right to pro rata contribution from their
cotortfeasors. 130 In the antitrust context, the distinction between in-
tentional and unintentional violations is too rigid since many fringe
defendants would fall into the intentional category, thereby prevent-
ing contribution from more culpable tortfeasors.
131
Settlements are encouraged by the 1955 Act. Settling defend-
ants are discharged from contribution liability as long as the settle-
ment is made in good faith. 3 2 While this would be an improvement
122. Id at 12.
123. See note 117 supra. Under the bill, the right of non price fixing defendants will be left
up to the courts, which for the most part have denied a right to contribution. The Committee
suggested that the courts could now adopt the approach taken in the securities cases by inter-
preting the statute in pari materia. S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1979).
124. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT (1939), reprinted in 12 UNI-
FORM LAWS ANN. 57-59 (1975).
125. For a catalog of the states that have adopted the 1939 Act, see S. REP. No. 428, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1979).
126. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 2(1) (1939 version), reprinted
in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 57, provides that "the right of contribution exists among joint
tortfeasors."
127. Id at § 5.
128. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEAsoRs ACT (1955 rev. version), reprinted
in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 63 (1975).
129. For a catalog of the states that have adopted the 1955 Act, see S. REP. No. 428, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1979).
130. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEAsORS ACT § 1 (1955 rev. version), re-
printed in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 63-64 (1975).
131. See notes 105-07 supra
132. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4 (1955 rev. version), re-
printedin 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 98 (1975).
over the present system, it would still permit harsh results if the non-
settling defendants are not released from the portion of the judgment
attributable to the settling defendant. An antitrust amendment pat-
terned after the 1955 Act, therefore, would not proceed far enough to
remedy the inequities of the present system.
4. Limited Congressional Support for a Case-By-Case Ap-
proach.-The dissenting members of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee that considered Senate Bill 1468133 proposed the following
alternative amendment to the Clayton Act: "Nothing in this section
shall be construed to bar contribution among persons found liable
for damages under the antitrust laws." 134  This legislation would
simply give congressional approval to the courts to exercise the doc-
trine of contribution on a case-by-case method similar to the securi-
ties cases. 13 5 An enactment of this type would provide the courts
with explicit power to order contribution but would not unduly com-
plicate litigation with mandatory rules that the court would have to
follow. 136
B. Judicial Approach
Professional Beauty adopted an innovative common-law ap-
proach by judicially creating a right to contribution.'37 The court
stated that since the antitrust statutes "are not purported to be com-
prehensive," it was not necessary to await congressional action. 38
Although the Abraham court did not question its authority to
adopt a right to contribution, it expressed the belief that Congress
was "a forum better suited to evaluation of the competing interests
and policies involved." '139 This confidence in Congress, however,
may be misplaced. "Rapid" or "expeditious" congressional action to
133. S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy
submitted supplemental views dissenting from the majority report).
134. Id at 41-42.
135. Section 9(e) of the Securities change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (e) (1971) is repre-
sentative of the contribution sections in the securities laws. That section provides: "Every
person who becomes liable to make any payment under this subsection may recover contribu-
tion as in cases of contract from any person who, if joined in the original suit, would have been
liable to make the same payment." Id
136. See Interview with Assistant Attorney General Shenefield, conducted by Bureau of
National Affairs (July 1979), reportedin 923 ANTITRUST & TRADE REQ. REP. (BNA) A-6 (July
19, 1979).
137. Professor Areeda has stated that the antitrust laws may be seen as providing "a gen-
eral authority to do what common law courts usually do: to use certain customary techniques
ofjudicial reasoning, to consider the reasoning and results of other common law courts, and to
develop, refine, and innovate in the dynamic common law tradition." P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS, 46 (2d ed. 1974).
138. 594 F.2d at 1183. The court in Professional Beauty noted that courts have not
awaited congressional action "to resolve many of the questions left unanswered by these stat-
utes, such as the nature of the cause of action, apportionment of judgments, assignment, sur-
vival and limitations." Id
139. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REQ. REP. (BNA) at F-4.
overrule the Supreme Court's Illinois Brick decision has extended
for over two years already. 4 ' In light of the recent congressional
track record, the federal judiciary is probably best suited to resolve
the question of contribution in antitrust cases.
Defendants in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation4 '
have asked the Supreme Court to review the conflict among the cir-
cuits on the contribution issue. The petition stated that "confusion,
uncertainty, injustice, and forum shopping will result if this lack of
uniformity is not cleared up."' 42 Although the recent Supreme
Court has been criticized for ignoring antitrust cases that badly need
authoritative direction, 43 the inconsistencies among the three cir-
cuits on such an important issue demand action.
Due to the wide variety of antitrust violators and the varying
degrees of culpability,' 4 no easy solutions to the contribution issue
exist that would provide equitable results in all cases. For this rea-
son, a flexible judicial approach is preferable to rigid, complex legis-
lative rules. This approach would allow the courts to look at the
effect contribution would have in each case. The courts, rather than
the plaintiffs, would be able to determine which wrongdoers should
bear the liability. This determination should be based on general
equitable principles including determination of "the relative respon-
sibility for originating, negotiating, and implementing the scheme
• . .who might reasonably [have] been expected to benefit from the
provision or conduct making the scheme illegal . . . whether one
party attempted to terminate the arrangement and encountered resis-
tence. . . and who ultimately profited or suffered from the arrange-
ment." 1
4 5
140. Bureau of National Affairs, Contribution-Fairness or Foll in Antitrust Litigation, 917
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at B-6 (June 7, 1979). Congressional debate to over-
rule Illinois Brick began shortly after the 1977 decision. In May 1978 the Senate Judiciary
Committee reported Senate Bill 1874, S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3-5 (1978). The bill has
not been adopted. See generaly Hoffman, Antitrust Standing: Congress Responds to Illinois
Brick, 1978 WASH. UNIv. L.Q. 529.
141. Reported in 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-I (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979)
(unpublished per curiam affirmance of Abraham's "no contribution" rule).
142. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., appeal dock-
eted, No. 79-972 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1979), reprinted in 945 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
A-14 (Jan. 3, 1980).
143. Posner, The Antitrust Decisions of the Burger Court, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 819, 825
(1978).
144. See notes 106-107 supra.
145. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1969)
(White, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Westvaco case on June 16, 1980. The case is
set for oral argument in tandem with Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,
606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Northwest Airlines challenges the denial of contribution in a
federal civil rights case. See notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra.
VI. Conclusion
The issue of contribution in private antitrust cases is ripe for
Supreme Court review. Since the better view provides that Congress
never considered the contribution issue, the Court has both the
power and the opportunity to determine the rights among antitrust
tortfeasors. The sharp division among the three circuits that have
addressed this important issue mandates a resolution of the problem
by the Supreme Court.
Contribution need not be allowed in every case. A perfect divi-
sion of damages would be time consuming, if not impossible. While
unintentional violators should always be given a right to contribu-
tion, intentional violators should also be given this right, when nec-
essary to provide fair resolution of the dispute between all parties.
Although the court in Professional Beauty provided the appropriate
method of determining when contribution should be allowed, its pro
rata division of damages is unacceptable in the majority of cases.
The approach of the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion, based on each contributing tortfeasor's relative responsibility, is
a more appropriate measure of contribution shares.
Since the antitrust laws encompass a wide variety of violations
and degrees of culpability, complex, comprehensive legislation
would provide only a rough form of justice. Therefore, if the
Supreme Court fails to provide adequate guidance, Congress should
adopt legislation modeled after the securities acts, which gives the
courts legislative support to apply the doctrine of contribution on a
case-by-case basis.
Although many problems exist in allowing contribution in an
area of the law as complex as antitrust, the courts have sufficient
procedural devices to minimize the problems. Courts have recog-
nized the necessity of abrogating the ancient common-law rule of
"no contribution" in other areas of federal law without serious com-
plications. The "no contribution" rule is especially outdated in anti-
trust cases in light of the huge judgments that result from class action
suits and treble damages. Since contribution is an equitable doc-
trine, the courts must be given the power to apply it when necessary
to prevent inequitable results.
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